Tuesday, December 28, 2010

दरबारबाट चुहिएका अनौठा तथ्य...


पुस्तक भोलि विमोचन हुने सुनिएको छ।
विकिलिक्सले नेपालको दरबार हत्याकान्डबारे केही सूचना चुहाउला कि भनेर मुख बाएर बसे पनि उनीहरुले अझै नेपालस्थित दूतावासबाट पठाएका सूचनाहरु चुहाएका छैनन्। अब त विकिलिक्सको समाचार पनि कम बन्न थालिसकेको छ। यसै मौकामा कान्तिपुर र नयाँ पत्रिका दैनिकले दरबारका तथ्यहरु चुहाएका छन्। यी सूचनाहरु सेनाका पूर्वरथी विवेककुमार शाहको बजारमा आउन बाँकी पुस्तक ‘मैले देखेको दरबार’ बाट साभार गरिएका हुन्। यसमा अहिलेसम्म हामीले नसुनेका कुराहरु पनि रहेछन्।
वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री माधवकुमार नेपाल र पूर्व प्रधानमन्त्री सूर्यबहादुर थापालाई त नङ्ग्याएकै छ यो पुस्तकले, माओवादीलाई भारतले तालिम दिएको आरोप पनि लगाएको छ। अहिलेसम्म दरबार हत्याकान्डको कुरा गर्दा त्यसको सीधा दोष ज्ञानेन्द्र र पारसलाई दिने र उनीहरुलाई शंका गर्ने प्रवृत्ति विपरीत शाहको पुस्तकमा भने हत्याकान्डमा देशी तथा विदेशी विशेषतः भारतको हात हुनसक्ने संकेत गरिएको छ।
“सूर्यबहादुर थापा त भारत कै मान्छे”
पुस्तकको एउटा अंशमा यस्तो छ- संयुक्त राष्ट्रसङ्घको शान्ति स्थापना मिसन कोसोभो गएका नेपाल प्रहरीका एक अधिकृतले मलाई त्यहाँबाट फर्किएर आएपछि सुनाएका थिए, ‘कोसोभो मिसनमा मैले काम गर्ने सेक्टरका प्रमुख भारतीय सिनियर आईपीएस अधिकृत थिए। एकदिन कुराकानीकै क्रममा उनले भने, ‘देखो हम नेपाल में जो चाहते हैं, वही होता है। दरबार में एक सैनिक सचिवको मालुम हो गया हैं कि भारत नेपाल के माओवादीओंको तालिम दे रहा है। भारत को लगा कि इससे उसको इसमें इम्ब्यारेसमेन्ट हो सकता है, इसलिए सैनिक सचिव को वहाँ से हटाना जरुरी हैं। हमारे भी दरबार में एडीसी हैं, और लोग भी हैं। और नेपाल के प्रधानमन्त्री सूर्यबहादुर थापा तो हमारे ही आदमी हैं। उनको भी सैनिक सचिव को हटाने के लिए प्रस्ताव भेज दिया। हमने उनको परिचालन किया और महाराज से कहकर सैनिक सचिव हटवाने को कहा। और महाराज ने भी उसको हटा दिया।’
नेपालको कुनै पनि पदमा नभएर पनि उनको बोलीले मिडियामा ठूलो स्थान पाउने, बेलाखबर भारत भ्रमणमा जाने कारण त यो पो रैछ कि क्या हो ? खोई यसबारे उनले अहिलेसम्म खण्डन पनि गरेका छैनन्।

माधव नेपाल त कस्तो दोधारे

पुस्तकको एक अंशमा वर्तमान प्रधानमन्त्री माधवकुमार नेपालको दोधारे पाराको खिल्ली उडाइएको छ। पुस्तकका अनुसार तत्कालीन विपक्षी नेता तथा एमाले महासचिव ‘यत्रो घटना घट्यो, अब यसको निष्पक्ष छानबिन हुनुपर्छ’ भनेर एमाले महासचिव माधवकुमार नेपालले निकै जोड दिएका रहेछन्। पुस्तकमा लेखिएको छ- सैनिक अस्पतालको पुस्तकालय हलमा अधिराजकुमार ज्ञानेन्द्रका साथै प्रधानमन्त्री कोइराला, प्रधानन्यायाधीश उपाध्याय, सभामुख रानाभाट, राष्ट्रिय सभाका अध्यक्ष डा. मोहसिन, राजपरिषद स्थायी समितिका सभापति डा. रायमाझी र प्रमुख विपक्षी दलका नेता नेपाल सम्मिलित बैठक बस्यो। हामी सचिवहरू पनि सहभागी भयौँ। यही बैठकमा राजदरबार हत्याकाण्डबारे जाँचबुझ गर्न एक उच्चस्तरीय आयोग गठन गर्ने निधो भयो। सुरुमा न्यायक्षेत्रका व्यक्तिमात्र राखेर आयोग गठन गर्ने प्रस्ताव आएको हो। तर महासचिव नेपालले नै ‘होइन, पार्टीका वरिष्ठ नेताहरू र विपक्षीका नेतासमेत बसेर आयोग गठन गरौँ’ भनेर प्रस्ताव गर्नुभयो। साथै उहाँले ‘यदि त्यसो नगर्ने हो भने उच्चस्तरीय आयोगमा प्रधानन्यायाधीशलाई अध्यक्ष राखेर सदस्यमा सभामुख रानाभाट र प्रमुख विपक्षी दलको नेताका रूपमा मलाईसमेत राख्नुहोस्’ भनी प्रस्ताव गर्नुभयो। बैठक सकेर फर्कने क्रममा समेत उहाँले ‘आयोगमा म छुटुँला नि’ भनिरहनुभएको थियो। तर गठन भइसकेपछि एमाले महासचिव नेपालले के कारणले हो, आयोगमा नबस्ने भनेर राजिनामा दिनुभयो।
यही कारणले पनि ज्ञानेन्द्र र माधव नेपालको सम्बन्ध पछिसम्मै पनि बिग्रेको भन्ने पनि सुनिएको थियो।

भारतको हस्तक्षेप

संविधानसभाको निर्वाचनमा भारतले नेपालका माओवादीलाई ठूलो शक्तिका रूपमा देख्न चाहेको थिएन। पहिले राजसंस्थालाई विस्थापित गर्न भारतले माओवादीलाई प्रयोग गर्‍यो भने संविधानसभाको निर्वाचन हुनुअघि माओवादीलाई ‘साइज’मा राख्न ‘मधेस कार्ड’ प्रयोग गर्न थाल्यो। यसै सन्दर्भमा म एउटा घटना सम्झन पुग्छु। २०६३ चैत ७ गते बुधबार साँझ भारतीय राजदूतावासमा कार्यरत द्वितीय सचिव दार्जिलिङनिवासी धीरज मुखियाको घरमा म केही साथीहरूका साथ डिनरमा गएको थिएँ। त्यसैदिन रौतहट जिल्लाको सदरमुकाम गौरमा माओवादीका २७ भन्दा बढी कार्यकर्ताको सामूहिक हत्या भएको थियो। हामी डिनरमा पुग्दा भारतीय दूतावासका तीन-चारजना कर्मचारी आइसकेका रहेछन्। तीमध्ये एकजनाको हातमा दुईवटा मोबाइल थिए। उनी एउटा सेटबाट सम्भवतः भारतीय राजदूत या आफ्नो हाकिमसँग र अर्कोबाट अन्य कुनै व्यक्तिसँग एकसुरले कुरा गरिरहेका थिए। उनी गौर घटनाको विवरण र अन्य जानकारी एउटा मोबाइलबाट ‘अपडेट’ गरी उक्त खबर अर्को मोबाइलबाट रिपोर्ट गरिरहेका थिए। साथै स्थानीय ‘इन्र्फमर’लाई केही निर्देशनसमेत दिँदै थिए। उनलाई गौरबाटै माओवादी कार्यकर्ताको हत्याबारे सम्पूर्ण ताजा विवरण आइरहेको थियो। त्यसबाट मलाई दूतावासका ती कर्मचारी भारतीय गुप्तचर संस्था रअका हुन् भन्ने स्पष्ट भयो।
संयोगवश उक्त घटनाको भोलिपल्ट माओवादी अध्यक्ष प्रचण्ड र नेता डा. बाबुराम भट्टराईसँग मेरो भेट भयो। गौर घटनाबाट उहाँहरू निकै हताश र संवेदनशील मनस्थितिमा हुनुहुन्थ्यो। उहाँहरूले मलाई ‘भारतलाई हामीले प्रयोग गरिरहेका छौँ भन्ने हाम्रो बुझाइ थियो, तर भारतले हामीलाई पो उल्टै खेलाइरहेको रहेछ, अहिले आएर हामी स्तब्ध भएका छौँ’ भन्नुभयो।

भारत वीरेन्द्रसँग किन रिसायो ?

राजदरबार हत्याकाण्ड हुनुभन्दा झन्डै वर्षदिन अघिदेखि शाही नेपाली सेनाको आधुनिकीकरणको कार्ययोजना बनिरहेको थियो। यसै सिलसिलामा नेपालले ‘अल्ट्रा मोडर्न’ हतियार एचके जी- ३६ राइफल किन्ने प्रक्रिया अगाडि बढाइरहेको थियो। यो हतियार नेपालमै ‘एसेम्बल’ गर्ने र दक्षिण एसियाली मुलुकमा बेच्नेसमेत योजना थियो। यसका लागि हतियार उत्पादक कम्पनी हेक्लर एन्ड कोकले समेत सहमति जनाइसकेको थियो। तर एचके जी- ३६ राइफल खरिद गर्ने र नेपालमै ‘एसेम्बल’ गर्ने योजना हाम्रो छिमेकी देश भारतलाई मनपरिरहेको थिएन। किनभने उसले भारतमै बनेको कम गुणस्तरको इन्सास राइफल बेच्न सबै किसिमले जोड दिइरहेको थियो। त्यसैले हतियारको राजनीति पनि राजदरबार हत्याकाण्डभित्र लुकेको एउटा प्रमुख कारण हुनसक्छ भन्ने मलाई लाग्छ।
हतियार प्रकरण चलिरहेकै बेला संसदले नागरिकतासम्बन्धी विधेयक पारित गरी लालमोहरका लागि राजदरबार पठाएको थियो। तर महाराजाधिराजबाट उक्त विधेयकमा लालमोहर लगाउनुपूर्व रायका लागि सर्वोच्च अदालत पठाइबक्सेको थियो। सर्वोच्चले उक्त नागरिकता विधेयक संविधानसम्मत छैन भन्दै खारेज गरिदिएको थियो। लालमोहर लागेको खण्डमा नेपालभित्र नेपालीहरू नै केही वर्षपछि अल्पमतमा पर्नसक्ने उक्त विधेयक खारेज भएपछि भारतका कैयौँ उच्च पदाधिकारीले सरकारसँग निकै चासो राखेर कुरासमेत गरेका थिए।
यसअघि २०४४ सालतिर नेपालले चीनबाट केही एन्टी एयरक्राफ्ट हतियार किन्दा पनि भारत निकै क्रुद्ध बनेको थियो। र नेपाललाई आर्थिक नाकाबन्दी गरेर नेपाली जनतालाई असह्य कष्ट दिएको थियो। यस्तै वीरेन्द्र सरकारबाट २०३१ सालमा सम्पन्न शुभराज्याभिषेकका अवसरमा नेपाललाई ‘शान्ति क्षेत्र’ घोषित गरियोस् भनेर राखिबक्सेको प्रस्तावलाई संसारका सबैजसो महत्त्वपूर्ण ११६ देशले स्वागत र समर्थन गरेका थिए। तर भारतले यस विषयमा समेत नकारात्मक दृष्टिकोण राखेर समर्थन गरेको थिएन। यी त केही घटनामात्र हुन्।
२०५७ सालको अन्तिमतिर महाराजाधिराजबाट चीनको महत्त्वपूर्ण भ्रमण सम्पन्न गरिबक्सेको थियो। यतिबेला सरकार नेपालको माओवादी समस्या समाधान गर्ने र केही वर्षदेखि जारी राजनीतिक गतिरोध अन्त्य गर्ने सोचाइमा होइबक्सन्थ्यो। त्यसका निम्ति तत्कालै शाही कदम चाल्नसक्ने अवस्था विकसित हुँदै थियो। सरकारबाट राजसंस्थाप्रति आस्था राख्ने र राष्ट्रवादी छवि बनाएका विभिन्न दलका नेताहरूसँग विचार-विमर्श गरिबक्सँदै थियो। पूर्ववरिष्ठ प्रशासक र सुरक्षाकर्मीहरूको ‘विशेष कार्यटोली’ बनाई मुलुकको समस्या समाधानका लागि योजना बनाउन लगाउनेबारे विचार भइरहेको थियो। अर्को विशेष कार्यटोली गठन गरी रणनीति तयार पार्न लगाउने र त्यसमार्फत माओवादीसँग वार्ता गर्ने सोचाइ थियो। यही क्रममा सरकारबाट भाइ पूर्वअधिराजकुमार धीरेन्द्र शाहलाई माओवादी नेताहरूसँग वार्ता गर्न खटाइबक्सेको थियो। साथै सरकारले शाही नेपाली सेनाका महासेनानी दिलीप रायमाझीलाई समेत माओवादीसँग सम्पर्क गर्न खटाइबक्सेको थियो।
माओवादीसँग कुनै हिसाबले सहमति भएपछि प्रतिनिधिसभा भङ्ग गर्ने र राजनीतिक नेताहरूको सहभागितामा गोलमेच सम्मेलन गरी माओवादीसहितको राष्ट्रिय सरकार गठन गर्ने सरकारको योजना थियो। साथै दुई वर्षपछि अर्को आमचुनाव गर्ने र चुनाव अगाडि संविधानको प्रस्तावना यथावत् राखी संविधान संशोधन गर्नेबारे समेत सरकारले गृहकार्य गरिबक्सेको थियो। संविधान संशोधन गरी राजाको भूमिका बेलायत या जापानको राजाको जस्तो वा भारतका राष्ट्रपतिको जस्तो निर्धारण गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने पनि सरकारको सोचाइ थियो। यो प्रस्ताव माओवादीलाई मान्य नभए राज्यका सबै शक्ति प्रयोग गरेर उसलाई निःशस्त्रीकरण गरी राजनीतिको मूलधारमा ल्याउने रणनीति पनि सरकारबाट सोचिबक्सँदै थियो। यसका लागि बेलायत र अमेरिकाको सहयोग लिनेबारे समेत प्रयास भइरहेको थियो। खासगरी यी दुई मुलुकका अधिकांश नेता, कूटनीतिज्ञ या अन्य पदाधिकारीहरू जसले महाराजाधिराजको दर्शनभेट पाउँथे, उनीहरू नेपालमा सुशासन भएन, भ्रष्टाचार बढ्यो, असुरक्षाका कारण आतङ्क फैलियो आदि कुराहरू गरेर सरकारलाई अप्रत्यक्ष रूपमा कुन न कुनै कदम चाल्न सुझाव दिइरहेका हुन्थे। सम्भवतः सरकारबाट चीन भ्रमणका अवसरमा समेत सहयोगको आश्वासन पाइबक्सेको थियो।
माओवादी समस्या नेपालका लागिमात्र नभएर भारतको समेत दीर्घकालीन समस्या हुनसक्छ भन्ने सरकारको विश्लेषण थियो। त्यसैले आफूले उठाउन चाहिबक्सेको कदममा भारतको सहयोग लिन मौसुफबाट व्यक्तिगत रूपमै प्रयास भइरहेको थियो। यसमा भारतको दृष्टिकोण सकारात्मक भएन भने माओवादीसँग रहेको उसको सम्बन्ध उजागर हुनेहुँदा भारतलाई नै असजिलो हुनसक्ने सरकारको बुझाइ थियो।

माओवादीलाई भारतमा तालिम

भारतले माओवादीलाई संरक्षण र सहयोग दिएको थियो भन्ने कुराका अनेकौँ संवेदनशील प्रसङ्गहरू म सैनिक सचिव छँदै जानकारीमा आएका हुन्। तीमध्ये एउटा प्रसङ्ग यहाँ उल्लेख गरौँ। २०६० असारतिर सशस्त्र प्रहरीबलको एउटा कम्पनी कमान्डो तालिमका लागि भारत गएको थियो। टोलीले देहरादुनदेखि ७० किलोमिटर टाढा मसुरीनजिकै जङ्गल र पहाडी इलाका रहेको चक्रातामा तालिम लिएको थियो। तालिम सकिएपछि नेपाल फर्किएर एकजना प्रहरी निरीक्षकले सशस्त्र प्रहरी महानिरीक्षक सहवीर थापालाई तालिमका क्रममा देखेका र सुनेका केही प्रसङ्ग सुनाएछन्। तिनका कुरा सुनेर सशस्त्र प्रहरी महानिरीक्षक थापा मलाई भेट्न आउनुभयो। उहाँले भन्नुभयो, ‘सशस्त्रको एउटा गुल्म भारतको चक्रातामा तालिमका लागि गएको थियो। त्यहाँ देखे-सुनेअनुसार उक्त गुल्म त्यहाँ गएको एक महिना अगाडि नेपालका माओवादीको टोलीले पनि सोही स्थानमा तालिम लिएको बुझियो। यो ज्यादै गम्भीर विषय हो।
यो कुरा सुनेर म अचम्ममा परेँ। चक्रातास्थित सशस्त्र तालिम केन्द्रमा भारतले पहिले श्रीलङ्काली पृथकतावादी तमिल विद्रोहीलाई पनि तालिम दिएको थियो। बङ्गलादेश स्वतन्त्रताका लागि मुक्ति वाहिनीलाई पनि भारतले सोही केन्द्रमा तालिम दिएको थियो। चक्राता तालिम केन्द्रस्थित इस्ट्याब्लिसमेन्ट- २२ नामक कम्प्लेक्स अमेरिकाले बनाइदिएको हो। अमेरिका र भारतले नेपालमा स्वतन्त्र तिब्बत आन्दोलनका लागि लडाकु तयार पार्ने क्रममा खम्पा लडाकुलाई समेत सोही स्थानमा सशस्त्र तालिम दिएका थिए। यस पृष्ठभूमिमा नेपालमा माओवादीको सशस्त्र शक्ति बढ्नु र सफल हुँदै जानुमा यो तालिम पनि महत्त्वपूर्ण कारण हुनसक्छ भन्ने मलाई लाग्यो।

हत्या किन भयो ?

मान्छेमा विभिन्न कमजोरी स्वाभाविक रूपले हुन्छन्। त्यस्तै कमी-कमजोरी दीपेन्द्र सरकारमा पनि थिए। सरकारको सबैभन्दा मुख्य कमजोरी महिला नै थियो। त्यस्तै एउटा परिवारमा हुनसक्ने कलह या झगडा राजा वीरेन्द्रको परिवारमा पनि थियो। दरबारमा काम गरेको लामो अनुभवका आधारबाट हेर्दा मलाई युवराजाधिराजको विवाहका सन्दर्भमा दरबारभित्र उठेको किचलोमा दीपेन्द्र सरकारलाई कुनै वैदेशिक शक्तिले खेलाएको अनुभव हुन्छ। यो मूलतः राजनीतिक षडयन्त्र थियो।
२०५७ सालको मध्यतिर सरकारबाट मलाई एउटा गोप्य फाइल अध्ययन गर्न दिइबक्सेको थियो। उक्त फाइलमा देशमा सङ्कट आएको अवस्थामा अपनाउनुपर्ने विभिन्न रणनीतिबारे उल्लेख गरिएको थियो। त्यस योजनाको नाम थियो- ‘वाज’। यसक्रममा सरकार पूर्वप्रधानसेनापति धर्मपालवरसिंह थापालाई अतिरथी -फिल्ड मार्सल) बनाएर सबै सुरक्षा निकायसँग समन्वयकर्ताको जिम्मेवारी दिने सोचमा होइबक्सन्थ्यो। उहाँलाई २०५८ वैशाख १ गते अतिरथी बनाउने तय भएको थियो। यसै समयमा राजनीतिक नेताहरू र उनीहरूका गतिविधिमा समेत निगरानी राख्ने योजना बनेको थियो। सरकारको योजना कार्यान्वयन भएको भए त्यसैबेला माओवादी समस्या समाधान हुने थियो। साथै २०४६ सालमा नराम्ररी क्षति भएको राजसंस्थाको छवि बढ्ने थियो र राजसंस्थाको भविष्य सुनिश्चित पनि हुने थियो। यो कुरा बेग्लै हो, सरकारको योजनाले अर्कै मोड लिएर वा अन्य कुनै कारणबाट पञ्चायती व्यवस्थाको पुनरावृत्ति भएको भए राजसंस्था त्यसै समयमा समाप्त हुने अवस्था सिर्जना हुन पनि सक्थ्यो।
मुलुकको समस्या समाधानका लागि यसरी एउटा गम्भीर योजनाले आकार लिन लागेका बेला रहस्यमय तरिकाले राजदरबार हत्याकाण्ड हुन पुग्यो। त्यसैले यस घटनामा स्वदेशी तथा विदेशी विभिन्न तत्त्वहरूको हात हुनसक्छ भन्ने मेरो विश्लेषण तथा निष्कर्ष रहेको छ। दुर्भाग्यवश आजसम्म त्यो पाटोको छानबिन हुनसकेको छैन।

भारतीय दूतावासलाई किन चाहियो  दरबारका कर्मचारीको बायोडाटा ?

२०५९ जेठ २७ गते सोमबार । भारतीय राजदूतावासले दरबारमा कार्यरत व्यक्तिहरूको व्यक्तिगत विवरण संकलन गर्न थालेको बुझिएको छ । त्यसअनुसार चिरनशमशेर थापा र विश्वविक्रम शाहले आ-आफ्नो व्यक्तिगत विवरण राजदूतावासमा पठाइसकेको र सुदनप्रसाद पोखरेलले पठाउन तयारी गरिरहेको कुरा आएको छ । त्यसै क्रममा मलाई सचिव विश्वविक्रमले ‘भारतीय राजदूतावासबाट जर्साबको व्यक्तिगत विवरण मागिएको छ, मलाई पठाइदिनू’ भन्नुभयो । मैले ‘मेरो व्यक्तिगत विवरण शाही जंगी अड्डा र राजदरबारमा मात्र रहन्छ, म अरू कसैलाई व्यक्तिगत विवरण पठाउँदिनँ’ भनिदिएँ । यो ज्यादै संवेदनशील विषय हो । यसका निम्ति मैले प्रमुख निजीसचिव सुदनप्रसाद पोखरेललाई गालीसमेत गरेँ । उहाँले विश्वले भन्यो भनेर हल्का रूपमा लिनुभयो ।
मैले यो कुरा सरकारमा जाहेर गरेँ ।
सरकार एकदमै रिसाइबक्स्यो । ‘बायोडाटा किन पठाउने ?’ सरकार क्रूद्ध होइबक्स्यो ।

परपीडक थिए दीपेन्द्र

परपीडक स्वभाव दीपेन्द्र सरकारमा सानैदेखि देखिन्थ्यो । दरबारमा उडिरहेको परेवा गुलेली हानेर मार्न खोजिबक्सन्थ्यो । गुलेली लागेर परेवा भुइँमा खस्दथ्यो पनि । अनि परेवा मरेको छैन भने त्यसलाई झनै दुःख दिएर मार्ने गरिबक्सन्थ्यो । उडिरहेको कागलाई पनि गोली हानेर झार्ने । र, त्यसै गर्ने । कहिलेकाहीँ जिउँदो मुसा समात्ने र पुच्छरमा आगो लगाइदिएर छोडिदिने । त्यसलाई तड्पाई-तड्पाई मार्ने ।
धेरै वर्षपछि दीपेन्द्र सरकारसम्बन्धी एउटा प्रसंग मैले सुनेको थिएँ । मौसुफ जन्मिबक्सेपछि न्वारानको दिन चिना बनाउने क्रममा ज्योतिषी दिव्यमंगल जोशीले ‘युवराजाधिराजको जन्म लगन ज्यादै खराब छ, राजपरिवारका लागि अनिष्ट पनि हुन सक्छ, राजा हुने योग पनि छैन’ भन्नुभएछ । यसपछि दरबारबाट उहाँलाई चिना सच्याएर राम्रो बनाउनू भनिएको रहेछ । तर, उहाँले मान्नुभएनछ । अनि तत्कालै उहाँलाई हटाएर अर्का ज्योतिषी डा. मंगलराज जोशीलाई ल्याएर चिना सच्याउन लगाइएछ । यो घटनापछि ज्योतिषी दिव्यमंगल जोशी कहिल्यै राजदरबार आउनुभएनछ । युवराजाधिराज दीपेन्द्रको स्वभाव, चरित्र र समग्र घटनाक्रम हेर्दा लाग्छ, ज्योतिषी दिव्यमंगल जोशीसामु सरकार र राजपरिवारको भविष्य त्यतिबेलै छर्लंग भइसकेको रहेछ ।

Monday, December 27, 2010

ँदरबार हत्याकाण्ड राजनीतिक षड्यन्त्र थियो’

कान्तिपुर संवाददाता
काठमाडौ, पुस ११ -
तत्कालीन राजा वीरेन्द्र मुलुकको दुर्गतिबाट आजित भएर सत्ता नियन्त्रणमा लिने तयारीमा थिए । युवराज दीपेन्द्रचाहिँ उनको उदारवादी कार्यशैलीबाट दिक्क थिए । त्यहीबीच राजनीतिक षड्यन्त्रअन्तर्गत दरबार हत्याकाण्ड भएको थियो । त्यसमा विदेशी शक्तिकेन्द्र पनि जोडिएको थियो । माओवादीलाई भारतीय सैन्य शिविरमा तालिम दिइएको थियो । त्यसबारे थाहा पाएलगत्तै राजाका सैनिक सचिव पदमुक्त गरिएका थिए ।

तिनै सैनिक सचिव विवेककुमार शाहले राजदरबारमा करिब ३० वर्ष कार्यरत छँदा थाहा पाएका थुप्रै अनुद्घाटित तथ्य चाँडै पुस्तकाकारमा सार्वजनिक गर्दैछन् । 'मैले देखेको दरबार' शीर्षकको ५९९ पृष्ठको यो पुस्तकमा समाविष्ट उनका संस्मरण र दैनिक डायरीमार्फत नेपाली राजनीतिकका अनेक पाटाको खुलासा हुँदैछ ।

वीरेन्द्रको "अपरेसन वाज"सेवानिवृत्त रथी शाहले आफ्नो पुस्तकमा दरबार हत्याकाण्ड हुनु ठीकअघि राजा वीरेन्द्रले सत्ता हातमा लिने तयारी गरेको रहस्यसमेत खोलेका छन् । त्यसनिम्ति 'अपरेसन वाज' नामको एक गोप्य योजना बनाइएको उनको भनाइ छ ।

एडीसी र सैनिक सचिवका रूपमा वीरेन्द्रसँग करिब २६ वर्ष बिताएका शाहले पुस्तकमा लेखेका छन्, 'माओवादीसँग कुनै हिसाबले सहमति भएपछि प्रतिनिधिसभा भंग गर्ने र राजनीतिक नेताहरूको सहभागितामा गोलमेच सम्मेलन गरी माओवादीसहितको राष्ट्रिय सरकार गठन गर्ने सरकारको -वीरेन्द्रको) योजना थियो ।'

दुई वर्षपछि आमचुनाव गर्ने र चुनावअगाडि संविधानको प्रस्तावना यथावत् राखी संविधान संशोधन गर्नेबारे समेत तत्कालीन राजाले गृहकार्य गरेको उनले खुलासा गरेका छन् । 'संविधान संशोधन गरी राजाको भूमिका बेलायत या जापानको राजाको जस्तो वा भारतका राष्ट्रपतिको जस्तो निर्धारण गरिनुपर्छ भन्ने पनि सरकारको सोचाइ थियो,' शाहले लेखेका छन्, 'यो प्रस्ताव माओवादीलाई मान्य नभए राज्यका सबै शक्ति प्रयोग गरेर उसलाई निःशस्त्रीकरण गरी राजनीतिको मूलधारमा ल्याउने रणनीति पनि सरकारबाट सोचिबक्सँदै थियो ।'

त्यही उद्देश्यअन्तर्गत राजाले आफ्ना भाइ धीरेन्द्र र सेनाका महासेनानी दिलीप रायमाझीलाई माओवादीसँग सम्पर्क एवं वार्ता गर्न छुट्टाछुट्टै रूपमा खटाएका थिए । वीरेन्द्रले देशमा संकट आएको अवस्थामा अपनाउनुपर्ने विभिन्न रणनीति उल्लेख गर्दै बनाएको 'वाज' नामक योजनाको गोप्य फाइल २०५७ को मध्यतिर आफूलाई अध्ययन गर्न दिएकोबारे शाहले उल्लेख गरेका छन् ।

वीरेन्द्रले पूर्वप्रधानसेनापति धर्मपालवर सिंह थापालाई फिल्ड मार्सल बनाएर सबै सुरक्षा निकायसँग समन्वयकर्ताको जिम्मेवारी दिने सोच बनाएका थिए । 'राजनीतिक नेताहरू र उनीहरूका गतिविधिमा समेत निगरानी राख्ने योजना बनेको थियो,' शाहले लेखेका छन् ।

२०५७ सालको अन्तिममा चीन भ्रमण गर्दा वीरेन्द्रले आफ्नो प्रस्तावित योजनामा सहयोगको आश्वासन पाएको हुनसक्ने शाहको आँकलन छ । उनले बेलायत र अमेरिकाको सहयोग लिने प्रयास गरेकोसमेत पुस्तकमा उल्लेख छ ।

'आफूले उठाउन चाहिबक्सेको कदममा भारतको सहयोग लिन मौसुफबाट व्यक्तिगत रूपमै प्रयास भइरहेको थियो,' सैनिक सचिव शाहका शब्दमा, 'यसमा भारतको दृष्टिकोण सकारात्मक भएन भने माओवादीसँग रहेको उसको सम्बन्ध उजागर हुने हुँदा भारतलाई नै असजिलो हुनसक्ने सरकारको बुझाइ थियो ।'

आफ्नो तयारी लागू गर्नै लागेका बेला वीरेन्द्र मारिए । 'मुलुकको समस्या समाधानका लागि यसरी एउटा गम्भीर योजनाले आकार लिन लागेका बेला रहस्यमय तरिकाले राजदरबार हत्याकाण्ड हुन पुग्यो,' शाहले त्यसलाई राजनीतिक षड््यन्त्र भनेका छन्, 'त्यसैले यस घटनामा स्वदेशी तथा विदेशी विभिन्न तत्त्वहरूको हात हुन सक्छ भन्ने मेरो विश्लेषण तथा निष्कर्ष रहेको छ ।'

हत्याकाण्डसँग जोडिएका रहस्य

दरबार हत्याकाण्डका पछाडि भारतीय भूमिका रहेको संकेत पूर्वरथी शाहले गरेका छन् । वीरेन्द्रले राजनीतिक कदम चाल्न लागेकोमात्र नभई जर्मन कम्पनी हेक्लर एन्ड कोकको हतियार 'एसेम्बल' गर्ने कारखाना काठमाडौंमै राख्ने र एचके जी-३६ नामको अत्याधुनिक राइफल उत्पादन गरेर दक्षिण एसियाली मुलुकहरूमा बेच्ने योजना पनि कतिपयले मन नपराएको वृत्तान्त पुस्तकमा छ ।

'एचके जी-३६ राइफल खरिद गर्ने र नेपालमै एसेम्बल गर्ने योजना हाम्रो छिमेकी देश भारतलाई मन परिरहेको थिएन । किनभने उसले भारतमै बनेको कम गुणस्तरको इन्सास राइफल बेच्न सबै किसिमले जोड दिइरहेको थियो,' शाहका भनाइमा, 'हतियारको राजनीति पनि राजदरबार हत्याकाण्डभित्र लुकेको एउटा प्रमुख कारण हुन सक्छ भन्ने मलाई लाग्दछ ।' वीरगन्जमा महावाणिज्य दूतावास स्थापना गर्न, बुटवललगायतका स्थानमा पेन्सन क्याम्प स्थापना गर्न र नेपालका लागि घातक हुने नागरिकता विधेयक जारी गर्न भारतले विभिन्न चरणमा निरन्तर दबाब दिइरहेको समेत उनले उल्लेख गरेका छन् ।

वीरेन्द्रलाई मन नपराउनेहरूले दीपेन्द्रलाई उकासेको पूर्वसैनिक सचिव शाहको दाबी छ । 'दीपेन्द्र सरकारलाई 'ही इज अ गुड लिडर, स्ट्रङ लिडर, दीपेन्द्र सरकार स्ट्रङ किङ हुन सकिबक्सन्छ' भनेर केही मान्छेले बारबार उक्साउने गरेको हामीले नदेखेका, नसुनेका होइनौं,' शाहले उल्लेख गरेका छन्, 'राजपरिवारभित्रको कलह र विवाद तथा कमीकमजोरीमा खेल्दै युवराजाधिराज दीपेन्द्रको महत्त्वाकांक्षालाई उकासेर लामो तथा सुविचारित षड्यन्त्रअन्तर्गत देशी तथा विदेशी शक्तिले दरबार हत्याकाण्ड गराएको हो भन्ने मेरो निष्कर्ष रहेको छ ।'

हत्याकाण्डपछि यसको छानबिन गर्न गठित उच्चस्तरीय आयोगले त्यो रात घटनास्थलमा के भएको थियो भनेर मात्र छानबिन गरेको, तर घटना किन भयो, त्यसमा कसले सहयोग गरेको थियो जस्ता पक्षको खोजी हुन नसकेको शाहको भनाइ छ । त्यसको छानबिन गर्न आवश्यक परे विदेशी विशेषज्ञको पनि सहयोग लिनुपर्छ भनेर जोड दिए पनि राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले ध्यान नदिएको उनले उल्लेख गरेका छन् । हत्याकाण्डमा मारिएकाहरूको पोस्टमार्टम पनि गरिएको थिएन ।

मुमा बडामहारानी रत्नको 'हुकुम' अनुसार त्यसो गरिएको शाहले खुलासा गरेका छन् । 'महाराजाधिराजको शरीरचाहिँ नचिर्ने हो कि ? हुकुम भयो । अनि प्रधानमन्त्री कोइराला पनि यस कुरामा सहमत हुनुभयो,' पुस्तकमा उल्लेख छ ।

माओवादीसँग रुष्ट भारत

राजसंस्थालाई विस्थापित गर्न भारतले माओवादीलाई प्रयोग गरे पनि संविधानसभा निर्वाचनबाट ठूलो शक्ति बनेपछि उसलाई 'साइज' मा राख्न 'मधेस कार्ड' प्रयोग गर्न थालेको शाहको बुझाइ छ । यस सन्दर्भमा उनले २०६३ चैत ७ गते भारतीय राजदूतावासमा कार्यरत द्वितीय सचिव दार्जिलिङ निवासी धीरज मुखियाको घरमा केही साथीहरूसँग डिनरमा जाँदा थाहा पाएको तथ्य सार्वजनिक गरेका छन् ।

त्यसै दिन गौरमा माओवादीका २७ भन्दा बढी कार्यकर्ता मारिएका थिए । 'हामी डिनरमा पुग्दा भारतीय दूतावासका तीन-चारजना कर्मचारी आइसकेका रहेछन् । तीमध्ये एक जनाको हातमा दुइटा मोबाइल थिए । उनी गौर घटनाको विवरण र अन्य जानकारी एउटा मोबाइलबाट 'अपडेट' गरी उक्त खबर अर्को मोबाइलबाट रिपोर्ट गरिरहेका थिए । साथै स्थानीय इन्र्फमरलाई केही निर्देशनसमेत दिँदै थिए । उनलाई गौरबाटै माओवादी कार्यकर्ताको हत्याबारे सम्पूर्ण ताजा विवरण आइरहेको थियो । त्यसबाट मलाई दूतावासका ती कर्मचारी भारतीय गुप्तचर संस्था रअका हुन् भन्ने स्पष्ट भयो,' शाहले लेखेका छन् ।

संयोगवश उक्त घटनाको भोलिपल्ट भेटिएका माओवादी नेताद्वय पुष्पकमल दाहाल र बाबुराम भट्टराईले शाहसँग भनेका रहेछन्, 'भारतलाई हामीले प्रयोग गरिरहेका छौं भन्ने हाम्रो बुझाइ थियो तर भारतले हामीलाई पो उल्टै खेलाइरहेको रहेछ, अहिले आएर हामी स्तब्ध भएका छौं ।'

संविधानसभा निर्वाचनमा माओवादी ठूलो पार्टीका रूपमा स्थापित हुनु, राष्ट्रियताका नारासमेत अगाडि सार्नु र माओवादी अध्यक्ष दाहालले प्रधानमन्त्रीका हैसियतमा पहिले चीनको भ्रमण गर्नुबाट भारत असन्तुष्ट बन्न पुगेको शाहको ठहर छ । 'भारत अब माओवादीबाट आफ्नो हितको रक्षा हुने देखिरहेको छैन । त्यसैले ऊ माओवादीलाई ठीक ठाउँमा ल्याउन चाहन्छ,' उनले लेखेका छन् ।



तत्कालीन सैनिक सचिवको खुलासा-





  •     माओवादीलाई भारतले चक्रातामा

  •     तालिम दिएको थियो

  •     वीरेन्द्रले संसद् भंग गरेर

  •     राजनीतिक कदम चाल्दै थिए

  •     स्वदेशी-विदेशी तत्त्वले दीपेन्द्रलाई

  •     राजा बन्न उक्साएका थिए




भारतद्वारा माओवादीलाई तालिम

भारतले माओवादीलाई संरक्षण र सहयोग दिएको भन्ने अनेक संवेदनशील प्रसंग आफू सैनिक सचिव छँदा जानकारीमा आएको शाहको भनाइ छ । त्यस क्रममा उनले २०६० असारतिर सशस्त्र प्रहरीको एउटा कम्पनी भारतको देहरादूननजिक चक्रातामा कमान्डो तालिम लिन जाँदा पाएको सूचना उल्लेख गरेका छन् ।

त्यहाँबाट फर्केका एक इन्स्पेक्टरले आफ्नो गुल्मले चक्रातामा जहाँ तालिम लिएको थियो, एक महिनाअघि माओवादी टोलीले पनि त्यही स्थानमा तालिम लिएको रिपोर्ट बुझाएका थिए । ती इन्स्पेक्टरको भनाइमा, 'सशस्त्रको टोलीलाई तालिम दिने क्रममा जस्तो स्यान्ड मोडल बनाइएको थियो, हुबहु त्यस्तै स्यान्ड मोडल माओवादीले दाङको सतबरिया, अछामको मंगलसेन र संखुवासभाको चैनपुर आक्रमणमा प्रयोग गरेका थिए ।'

तालिम केन्द्रबाहिरका चिया पसलेले समेत 'योभन्दा अगाडि नेपालबाट तालिमका लागि आएको टोलीमा महिला पनि थिए तर तपाईंको टोलीमा महिला रहेनछन्' भनेको पनि ती इन्स्पेक्टरले उल्लेख गरेका थिए । त्यस्तै एकजना प्रशिक्षकले 'भारतले यो के गरेको होला, नेपालका माओवादी र नेपालकै सशस्त्र प्रहरीलाई पालैपालो तालिम दिइरहेको छ' भनेका थिए ।

भारतले श्रीलंका तमिल विद्रोही, बंगलादेशका मुक्ति बाहिनी र तिब्बतका खम्पाहरूलाई चक्राताको त्यही 'इस्ट्याब्लिसमेन्ट-२२' नामक अमेरिकाले बनाइदिएको 'कम्प्लेक्स' मा तालिम दिएको थियो । नेपालका माओवादीलाई समेत त्यहीं तालिम दिइएको सूचना आएपछि आफूले राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रसमेतको सहमतिमा गुप्तचर विभागका पूर्वडीआईजी लालबहादुर थापालाई २०६० साउनमा गोप्य अनुसन्धानमा खटाएको शाहले खुलासा गरेका छन् ।

चक्राता क्षेत्रको जानकार भएकाले थापालाई उक्त जिम्मेवारी दिइएको र उनी त्यही वर्ष दसैं-तिहार ताका त्यहाँ जाने तय भए पनि त्यसपश्चात् उनी 'बेपत्ता' भएको तर आफूचाहिँ सैनिक सचिवबाटै पदमुक्त हुनुपरेको विवरण शाहले उल्लेख गरेका छन् । उनलाई तत्कालीन राजा ज्ञानेन्द्रले २०६० कात्तिकमा राजीनामा मागेका थिए ।

कोसोभोस्थित संयुक्त राष्ट्रसंघीय मिसनबाट फर्केका नेपाल प्रहरीका अर्का अधिकृतको सनसनीखेज भनाइ शाहले पुस्तकमा उद्धृत गरेका छन्, 'कोसोभो मिसनमा मैले काम गर्ने सेक्टरका प्रमुख भारतीय सिनियर आईपीएस अधिकृत थिए । एक दिन कुराकानीकै क्रममा उनले भने, 'हेर, नेपालमा हामी जे चाहन्छौं, त्यही हुन्छ । दरबारमा एकजना सैनिक सचिवलाई थाहा भयो कि, भारतले नेपालका माओवादीलाई तालिम दिइरहेको छ । भारतलाई लाग्यो, यसबाट उसलाई इम्ब्यारेसमेन्ट हुन सक्छ, त्यही भएर ती सैनिक सचिवलाई त्यहाँबाट हटाउन जरुरी छ । हाम्रो पनि दरबारमा एडीसी छन्, अरू मान्छे पनि छन् । अनि नेपालका प्रधानमन्त्री सूर्यबहादुर थापा त हाम्रै मान्छे हुन् । उनीसमक्ष पनि सैनिक सचिवलाई हटाउन प्रस्ताव पठाइयो । हामीले उनलाई परिचालन गर्‍यौं र महाराजलाई भनेर सैनिक सचिव हटाउन भन्यौं । अनि महाराजले पनि उनलाई हटाए ।'

Friday, December 24, 2010

Australian police drop probe into WikiLeaks

AFP
A woman joins hundreds of other Australians rallying in support of WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in Sydney on December 10, 2010. Australian police Friday said they had dropped their inquiries into whistleblowing website WikiLeaks, saying it had not broken any laws under their jurisdiction in releasing US diplomatic cables.
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
SYDNEY: Australian police Friday said they had dropped their inquiries into whistleblowing website WikiLeaks, saying it had not broken any laws under their jurisdiction in releasing US diplomatic cables.

The Australian government had previously said the actions of WikiLeaks, founded by Australian-born Julian Assange, were "grossly irresponsible" and potentially illegal.

But the Australian Federal Police (AFP) said it would not be investigating the matter further after finding no evidence of criminal activity it could prosecute.

"The AFP has completed its evaluation of the material available and has not established the existence of any criminal offences where Australia would have jurisdiction," it said in a statement.

"Where additional cables are published and criminal offences are suspected, these matters should be referred to the AFP for evaluation."

The Australian government has rounded on WikiLeaks and Assange with Prime Minister Julia Gillard saying the "foundation stone" for the release of the sensitive cables had been an illegal act.

Attorney-General Robert McClelland said the AFP had noted a number of offences that could be applied depending on the circumstances, but had not identified any criminal offences where Australia had jurisdiction.

"The government referred the matter to the AFP as it was prudent to examine whether any Australian laws have been broken," he said in a statement.

"As has previously been stated, given the documents published to date are classified by the United States, the primary jurisdiction for any investigation into the matter remains the United States."

McClelland said the government remained extremely concerned about the "unauthorised and irresponsible distribution of classified material".

WikiLeaks chief says US preparing to indict him

AFP
Julian Assange head of WikiLeaks talks during a press conference at the home of Frontline Club founding member Vaughan Smith, at Bungay, England, Friday, Dec. 17, 2010. Assange said he feared that the United States is getting ready to indict him, saying Friday that he believed that a grand jury was meeting to consider charges against him. He has repeatedly voiced concerns that American authorities were getting ready to press charges over WikiLeaks' release of some 250,000 secret State Department cables, which have angered and embarrassed officials in Washington.
AFP
BUNGAY: The founder of WikiLeaks said Friday he fears the United States is preparing to indict him, but insisted that the government secret-spilling site would continue its work despite what he calls a dirty tricks campaign against him.

Julian Assange spoke from snowbound Ellingham Hall, a supporter's 10-bedroom country mansion where he is confined on bail as he fights Sweden's attempt to extradite him on allegations of rape and molestation.

He insisted to television interviewers that he was being subjected to a smear campaign and "what appears to be a secret grand jury investigation against me or our organization."

Attorney General Eric Holder has said repeatedly a criminal investigation of the WikiLeaks' continuing release of some 250,000 secret U.S. State Department cables is under way and that anyone found to have broken the law will be held accountable.

The Justice Department has provided no other public comment on who is under investigation or its legal strategy.

If pursued, the case could pit the government's efforts to protect sensitive information against press and speech freedoms guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. The government suspects WikiLeaks received the documents from an Army private, Bradley Manning, who is in the brig on charges of leaking other classified documents to the organization.

Assange did not elaborate on the rumored grand jury investigation, but said he had retained an unspecified U.S. law firm to represent him.

A British High Court judge freed Assange on bail Thursday on condition he reside at the 600-acre estate in eastern England, wear an electronic tag and report to police daily. Assange spent nine days in prison after handing himself in to British police on Dec. 7. He is wanted in Sweden for questioning about sex allegations leveled against him by two women he spent time with while visiting the country in August.

Swedish officials — and the lawyer for the women involved — have denied accusations from Assange and his supporters that the allegations are politically motivated.

Attempts to reach Assange's British lawyers weren't immediately successful Friday.

In an interview Friday on ABC's "Good Morning America," Assange said he had never heard Manning's name until the press began reporting it, although in another interview at Ellingham Hall he appeared close to acknowledging he was one of WikiLeaks' sources.

He called him "a young man somehow embroiled in our publishing activities."

"We can see that he's the only person, only one of our military sources, who has been accused," he said.

Assange has also warned of a smear campaign, saying that he expected new allegations about him to surface sometime Friday. It wasn't immediately clear what he was referring to, and no fresh accusations had been made public by early evening in Europe.

However, Assange's personal life — and that of his accusers — have been under intense scrutiny since the Sweden rape allegations first became known, and in the past few days new details have leaked to the Web.

Online gossip site Gawker.com has published what it claims are Assange's profile on matchmaking website OKCupid.com and excerpts from e-mails it said he exchanged with a young female love interest from several years back. The sometimes cringe-inducing details have been an online sensation.

WikiLeaks has not responded to requests for the comment on the personal details now circulating on the Web, but OKCupid's chief executive said that the profile alleged to be Assange's had been up since at least Dec. 31, 2006 — well before the 39-year-old Australian won fame for his online activism.

Assange said that the personal attacks were to be expected.

"It's the case with anyone that's the head of an organization that is exposing major powers and has major opposition that they will be attacked. Every aspect of their life will be scrutinized. This organization is no exception," he told the BBC late Thursday.

But Assange's accusers have felt the online heat too. WikiLeaks' Facebook site links to an article that names one of the women involved and attacks her as a "groupie" who engaged in a "carefully planned character assassination."

WikiLeaks did not immediately respond to a query about why it was helping to drive traffic to a site which appears to denigrate an alleged sex crime victim.

Assange, a globe-trotting activist who once described himself as a homeless refugee, may have to stay at Ellingham Hall for a long time. His next hearing is set for early January and his extradition is due to be decided the following month. Appeals could drag the process out even further.

In the meantime, Assange will remain as the guest of Vaughan Smith, a former army captain and supporter who also runs the Frontline Club, a well-known journalists' hangout. The 18th century house, which has been in Smith's family for generations, hosts an organic farm that supplies the Frontline's well-reviewed restaurant.

Arriving just as his curfew came into force Thursday night, Assange told reporters he was looking forward to spending Christmas at Ellingham. Although he chafed against the conditions of his bail — describing them as tantamount to "high-tech house arrest" — he was quoted by the BBC as saying he looked forward to doing some fishing.

More to the point, WikiLeaks spokesman Kristinn Hrafnsson said the house had a decent Internet connection, enabling Assange to get back to work coordinating the release of the 250,000 U.S. Embassy cables, the overwhelming majority of which remain unpublished.

Assange hi-tech terrorist: Biden

MADRID: Wikileaks founder Julian Assange pushed back today after US Vice President Joe Biden blasted him as a dangerous ‘hi-tech terrorist’.

The 39-year-old Australian also told the Spanish daily El Pais that he was in ‘a condition of high-tech arrest’ although he was released on bail by a British court last week while he fights extradition to Sweden, where he is wanted for questioning over allegations of sex crimes.

Asked whether he thought Assange was a hi-tech terrorist or a whistleblower akin to those who released the Pentagon Papers — a series of top-secret documents revealing US military policy in Vietnam — Biden said Sunday: “I would argue that it’s closer to being hi-tech terrorist.” And he said the US Justice Department was mulling how to take legal action against the Australian. But Assange responded by noting that ‘terrorism is defined as the use of violence for political purposes’.

“Biden’s administration continues to take offense at our organisation and the press with a violent or political objective, so who are the terrorists?” he said. Assange has enraged Washington by obtaining a cache of some 250,000 US diplomatic cables and slowly releasing the documents through his whistleblowing website.

Norwegian daily to publish all 250‚000 WikiLeaks cables


AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE
OSLO: A Norwegian daily that obtained all the 250‚000 diplomatic cables WikiLeaks is slowly releasing and will publish articles on them independently of the whistleblowing website’s strategy‚ its boss said today.

“We have gained access to all 250‚000 documents‚” said Ole Erik Almlid‚ the managing editor of Aftenposten‚ refusing to say how his newspaper obtained all the classified cables‚ which WikiLeaks has not yet released entirely. At the end of November‚ WikiLeaks said it obtained 251‚287 classified US embassy cables and would cooperate with publications El Pais‚ The Guardian‚ The New York Times‚ Le Monde and Der Spiegel in releasing them.

It also started gradually posting the documents online. On Thursday‚ 1‚896 documents out of a total of 251‚287 were available on WikiLeaks’ Cablegate website. Almlid said Aftenposten’s strategy of publishing articles on the cables would be completely independent from when WikiLeaks or the website’s partner publications release them. Aftenposten could thus run articles on cables that WikiLeaks itself has not yet released‚ he said.

“We will not under any circumstance publish all articles on the web. We will use these documents to write journalistic articles about issues that are important for us to bring to our readers‚” he said.

“We have been publishing five articles every day both on print and on our website‚ and we will continue to do that‚” Almlid added‚ stressing that Aftenposten would not make all documents available online‚ but that a cable could be partially published to go with an article.

Meanwhile‚ WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange has said his whistleblowing website plans to publish hundreds of ‘sensitive’ US diplomatic cables on Israel‚ Al-Jazeera reported today.

‘Sensitive and classified documents’ on Israel’s 2006 war on Lebanon and January’s assassination in Dubai of Hamas militant Mahmud al-Mabhuh would be released‚ Assange told Al-Jazeera in an interview.

Assange said WikiLeaks had 3‚700 US documents on Israel‚ including 2‚700 originating from the Jewish state‚ but denied the website had any agreement in place to spare the country of leaks. “We do not have any secret deals with any country‚” he said according to an Arabic translation of remarks he made in English which were posted on Al-Jazeera’s website.

GOOGLE

 

Thursday, December 23, 2010

कुरा नयाँ टुविटर को #NewTwitter [Friday Tech]

हिजो आज, टुविटर मा  टुविट खुबै देखिन्छ, ‘नयाँ टुविटर’ बारे ! कोही नयाँटुविटर चलाउँदै भनेर टुविट गरिरहेकाछन् भने, कोही आफ्नो चाँहि किन नयाँ टुविटर आएन भनेर, टुविट गरिरहेका भेटिन्छन् । कोही कोही चाँहि, यो नयाँटुविटर को लागि कतै साइन अप गर्नु पर्छ कि भनेर खोजिरहेका पनि देखिएको छ । newtwitter_logo
आखिर के हो त नयाँ टुविटर ?
‘नयाँ टुविटर’ खासै केही होइन, त्यो हामीले चलाइराखेकै पुरानै टुविटर नै हो ! नयाँ टुविटर मा मात्र  डिजाइन परिवर्तन गरिएको छ अनि केही नयाँ ‘फिर्चस्'हरु थपिएको छ । नयाँ टुविटर को लागि कहिँ कतै साइन अप पनि गर्नु पर्दैन, कसैलाई रिक्वेष्ट र कम्प्लेन गरेर पनि हुँदैन । टुविटर ले बिस्तारै सबै प्रयोगकर्ताहरुलाई नयाँ टुविटर को ‘वेव इन्टरफेस’ उपलब्ध गराउने भएको छ ।
टुविटर का CEO ‘EV’ लाई नयाँ टुविटर को बारेमा धेरै गुनासा र रिक्वेष्ट गरेपछि हिजो उनले टुविटर मै भने, “Requests/complaints for #newtwitter have rendered my @ mentions kinda useless. I appreciate the interest, though. Soon, folks. Soon! :)”
अत: नयाँ टुविटर चलाउन पाइएन भनेर धन्दा नमान्नुस, नयाँ टुविटर बिस्तारै तपाई को मा आउँदैछ । हालसम्म ५० प्रतिशत जति, प्रयोगकर्ता ले नयाँ टुविटर चलाउन पाइसकेकाछन् ।
ev tweets नयाँ टुविटर मा भएका केही कुरा :
१) नयाँ डिजाइन
२) फोटो, भिडियो आदि टुविटर कै साइटमा हेर्न मिल्ने
३) सम्बन्धित टुविटहरु एकै ठाउँमा देखाउने
४) मिनि प्रोफाइल देखाइदिने
newtwitter  releated tweets
फोटो र सम्बन्धित टुविट टुविटर कै होमपेज मा देखाइएको
profile
नयाँ टुविटर मा आफ्नो प्रोफाइल
Click on the image for larger view.

Android In Spaaaace!

Wednesday, December 22, 2010 | 10:47 AM
Here at Google, we’re all about exploration. It’s no surprise that some of our favorite products are built to let you explore the world in ways never before possible. Google Maps lets you find your way all around the world. Google Earth lets you explore the planet in detail, complete with trees and oceans. And Google Sky Map lets you explore the skies right from your Android device. Well, we wanted to do a little exploring of our own, so we decided to venture into near space, with the help of some Androids.

Recently, we travelled to Ione, CA and sent seven payloads up, up, and away into near space, each equipped with a Nexus S. We took some cues from others who have sent homemade weather balloon rigs far up, and we wanted an opportunity to collect some interesting data about the sensors in Nexus S – GPS, gyroscope, accelerometer, and magnetometer. We also couldn’t resist what looked like a great way to spend a weekend. Sending the balloons up also gave us an opportunity to capture some stunning imagery and videos of Earth. Take a look at unaltered footage of an Android at over 100,000 ft above the Earth’s surface:





The Rig
How did we get our little Android commanders that high up? Well, first the Android platform provides a robust development environment and Nexus S has a great set of embedded sensors, both of which made it easy for us to write the apps we needed for this project. Going forward with other similar projects we have an open environment that we can modify at any level necessary. We then worked with UCSC student Greg Klein to prepare each of the payloads, which were housed in foam coolers. We secured a nylon load line to the cooler and attached to it a radar reflector, a parachute, and finally, a weather balloon. Every payload had an APRS transmitter attached to a GPS that was known to work at high altitudes, as well as batteries for power. The remainder of each payload was different for each balloon: some had digital cameras taking pictures and some had video cameras mounted at various angles (up, down, and at the horizon).

These phones were running a variety of apps: Google Maps for Mobile 5.0 (with offline map data) which allowed us to see what was directly below the balloon, Google Sky Map to see if we could identify the real stars in the backdrop, Latitude to report location when the phones had a data connection, and our own custom sensor logging app that sampled all the available sensors on the device. We even manned our payloads with some special astronauts: small Android robots, and boy did they fly. Check out an in-depth look at how we prepared and launched the payloads:




What We Found
The payloads collected a lot of data, and many reached high altitudes, with the highest topping out at 107,375 ft., over 20 miles high, or over three times the height of an average commercial jet. We also clocked one of the payloads at 139 mph at its fastest.

In tracking the sensors on each of the phones, we observed that the GPS in Nexus S could function up to altitudes of about 60,000 ft. and would actually start working again on the balloon’s descent. We also saw that Nexus S could withstand some pretty harsh temperatures (as low as -50˚C). Some interesting data we collected:
Maximum Speed: 139 mph
Maximum Altitude: 107,375 ft (over 20 miles, over 30 km)
Maximum Ascent Rate: 5.44 m/s
Average Flight Duration: 2 hours, 40 minutes
Average Descent Time: 34 minutes

By analyzing all the collected data, we were able to find some interesting trends. For instance, we determined the speed and altitude of the jet stream: about 130mph at 35,000 ft.

In the end, the team recovered all of the payloads sent up, we even recovered the payload we sent as a test a week prior to the actual launch. We had a blast taking Android all the way up to near space. If your interested in launching a balloon of your own, click here for more info. We have more exciting things coming your way as we use the openness of the Android platform to experiment here at mission Android headquarters.

जुलियन असाञ्ज भए वर्ष व्यक्ति [Man of the Year]

विकिलिक्स का संस्थापक सम्पादक जुलियन असाञ्ज ‘टाइम वर्ष व्यक्ति’ घोषित नभर के भो त ! आखिर जुलियन को कार्यलाई कदर गर्दै  फ्रान्सको प्रतिष्ठित पत्रिका ‘ले मोन्डे’ ले जुलियनलाई वर्ष व्यक्ति घोषणा गरेको छ ।
फ्रान्सेली पत्रिका ‘ले मोन्डे’ ले शुक्रबार को अंक को पहिलो पृष्ठ  ३९ वर्षिय जुलियन असाञ्ज प्रति समर्पित गर्दै “Man of the Year”  भनेर असाञ्जलाई घोषणा गरेको हो । “ले मोन्डे” को वेवसाइट का पाठकहरु ले दिएको भोट को आधार मा जुलियन असाञ्ज वर्ष व्यक्ति घोषित भएका हुन् । उनले कुल भोट को ५६.२ प्रतिशत भोट पाएका थिए भने केही दिन अघि टाइम को वर्ष व्यक्ति २०१० घोषित  भएका फेसबुक का सहसंस्थापक ‘मार्क जुकरवर्ग’ ले जम्मा ६.९ प्रतिशत मात्र भोट पाएका थिए ।
Julian-Assange
‘गार्जियन’, ‘न्यु योर्क टाइम्स’ आदि पत्रिका सँग सँगै ‘ले मोन्डे’ पत्रिका ले पनि विकिलिक्स ले उपलब्ध गराएको अमेरिकी दुतावासका दस्तावेजहरु  प्रकाशित गरेको थियो । बधाई छ, जुलियन असाञ्जलाई, कम्ति मा, टाईमले जस्तो गरेर ‘ले मोन्डे’ ले त आफ्ना पाठकहरुलाई झुक्याएन ।
Smile

Tuesday, December 21, 2010

ठूलो यःमरी

Click on the slide!


यःमरी पुन्हिको अवसरमा ठूलो योमरीसहित नगरपरिक्रमा गर्दै नेवार समुदायका किसान। नेवार भाषामा 'यः' को अर्थ 'मनपर्ने' र 'मरी' को अर्थ रोटी हुन्छ। तस्बिरः रुबी रौनियार

Sunday, December 19, 2010

आयो विकिलिक्सको नयाँ खुलासा


विकिलिक्सले भर्खरै नेपालसम्बन्धी तीन वटा दस्तावेज सार्वजनिक गरेको छ। तर अझै पनि काठमाडौँ दूतावासबाट जारी कुनै पनि दस्तावेज सार्वजनिक भएको छैन। नयाँ दिल्लीस्थित अमेरिकी दूतावास कै गोप्य दस्तावेज हुन् यी। हेरौँ के के सार्वजनिक भएको छ यी दस्तावेजमा ?
नयाँ दिल्लीस्थित भारतीय दूतावासले १८ अप्रिल २००६ मा पठाएको ‘केबल’मा एउटा गजबको खुलासा भएको छ। नेपालका माओवादीहरुले अक्सर भन्ने गर्छन् हामी र भारतका माओवादीबीच वैचारिक सम्बन्ध मात्र हो, अरु कुनै किसिमको सम्बन्ध छैन। तर यो केबलमा भारत सरकारले उनीहरुबीच वैचारिक सैचारिक केही सम्बन्ध हैन, हतियार किनबेचको व्यवसायिक सम्बन्ध मात्र छ भनेको रहेछ। उनीहरु बीच कुनै महत्त्वपूर्ण ‘अपरेसनल लिङ्क’ नभएको पनि भारत सरकारले बताएको रहेछ। नेपाली माओवादीहरु नक्सलवादी प्रभावित क्षेत्रमा खुला रुपमा आवतजावत गर्ने चाहिँ त्यसमा स्वीकार गरिएको छ। तर माओवादी नेताहरु प्रचण्ड र बाबुराम भट्टराईलाई हामीले सेल्टर दिएर राखेका छैनौँ बरु माओवादीका उच्च नेताहरुलाई हाम्रो जेलमा हिरासतमा राखेका छौँ भन्दै अमेरिकालाई स्पष्टीकरण दिएका रहेछन् भारतीय सरकारले।
यो केबल भारत र माओवादीबीच सम्बन्ध नजिक रहेको बेलाको हो। सन् २००६ मा भारतको मध्यस्थतामा दल र माओवादीबीच १२ बूँदे समझदारी भइसकेपछि आन्दोलन हुँदै गर्दाको यो दस्तावेज हो।
दस्तावेजमा काठमाडौँ र यहाँको विमानस्थल पाकिस्तानको आइएसआइ समर्थित आतंकवादीहरुको सञ्जाल सञ्चालनको केन्द्रबिन्दू बनेको तर नेपाल सरकारले त्यस विषयमा आँखा चिम्लेको गुनासो पनि गरिएको छ।
दस्तावेज जस्ताको तस्तै हेर्नुस-


Wikileaks Viewing cable 06NEWDELHI2587, SCENESETTER FOR APRIL 19 US-INDIA CT JOINT WORKING
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
06NEWDELHI2587 2006-04-18 07:07 2010-12-16 21:09 SECRET Embassy New Delhi
VZCZCXRO5949
OO RUEHBI RUEHCI RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHNE #2587/01 1080708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 180708Z APR 06 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2627
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1476
RUEHLM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 4713
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 4748
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7699
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2685
RUEHKT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 5407
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 9375
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7857
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3094
RUEHCI/AMCONSUL CALCUTTA 3179
RUEHCG/AMCONSUL CHENNAI 3064
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI 3374
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 2424
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI 2319
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 3078
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEAHLC/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0198
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
Tuesday, 18 April 2006, 07:08
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 12 NEW DELHI 002587
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
STATE FOR S/CT, DS/IP/ITA AND DS/IP/SA
EO 12958 DECL: 04/18/2015
TAGS PTER, PGOV, PINR, PREL, PINS, MASS, KJUS, KTIA, TBIO,
KCRM, TINT, EFIN, EAIR, SNAR, KISL, IN, PK, BK, NE
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR APRIL 19 US-INDIA CT JOINT WORKING
GROUP
REF: A. NEW DELHI 2446 B. NEW DELHI 2361 C. NEW DELHI 2291 D. NEW DELHI 2229 E. NEW DELHI 2119 F. NEW DELHI 1632 G. NEW DELHI 1611 H. NEW DELHI 1318 I. NEW DELHI 93 J. 05 CHENNAI 2901 K. 05 NEW DELHI 9421 L. 05 NEW DELHI 9249 M. 05 NEW DELHI 8782 N. 05 NEW DELHI 8436 O. 05 NEW DELHI 7725 P. 05 NEW DELHI 6596 Q. 05 NEW DELHI 5165 R. 05 MUMBAI 1688 S. 05 NEW DELHI 3647 T. 04 NEW DELHI 878 U. 04 NEW DELHI 877 V. 04 NEW DELHI 876
Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
¶1. (C) Summary: The US-India counterterrorism dialogue reflects our shared values and encompasses the range of CT issues in South Asia. New Delhi focuses on combating jihadi terrorism launched from Pakistan, which complicates USG efforts to engage Delhi in a more vibrant intelligence dialogue without compromising relations with Islamabad. The GOI is less concerned with discussing Naxalite (Maoist agrarian peasant movement) or ethno-linguistic separatist terrorism in India’s Northeast states. The GOI’s focus also remains on here-and-now terrorism vice more exotic and more potentially devastating variants such as bio-terrorism and WMD-terrorism. The exception here is on cyber-terrorism/cybersecurity, where the growing financial and prestige value of India’s IT sector is helping energize positive interactions. India’s large Muslim population, and that community’s relatively positive relations with its Hindu majority, also offer insights on how we can more effectively engage in the battle of ideas against violent extremism within a democratic, pluralistic society.
¶2. (C) Since the August 2004 CTJWG, the GOI has moved forward with counterterrorism legislation and policy, including on terrorist finance and hijackings, but we still have gaps in our understanding of how these new procedures will be implemented. India has a vast capacity to absorb USG counterterrorism training; although we see Indian security services replicating the training they receive, our challenge now is to rationalize the training the USG offers to ensure it meets mutually-agreed goals. There is also ample room to expand information and intelligence sharing between the USG and GOI, but much will depend on the degree to which US priorities align with Indian goals. Overcoming the lingering effects of decades of mutual mistrust is also essential. Embassy New Delhi has had some experience with working under the US-India Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) that came
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into force in October; there is room here too for improvement. Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becoming a member of the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). This message also includes information on other terrorism-related topics that the GOI delegation may reference, either in the formal CTJWG or in side-meetings.
¶3. (C) Since the last CTJWG a host of bilateral interactions, including disaster cooperation (the December 2004 tsunami and the October 2005 earthquake), foreign policy alignment (on Nepal and Afghanistan), the Defense Framework Agreement, the July 18 nuclear agreement, and the President’s visit capped off by the civil nuclear deal, have brought the two countries much closer together in a variety of venues. Our CT bureaucracies and security services, however, lag behind growing bilateral movement on trade, energy and scientific cooperation, but the background atmospherics are encouraging. We now need to foster new thinking in Delhi and Washington that will advance our common CT agendas faster than before possible. End Summary.
CT Bureaucratics
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¶4. (S) The MEA has the lead on international CT cooperation, with Additional Secretary (International Organizations) KC Singh the GOI’s interlocutor (Ref K). On-the-ground CT activity at the national level is the bailiwick of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), however. In some instances, such as on the 2005 offer of an Itemizer to help secure the Srinagar-Muzzafarabad bus, we have been quietly told by our MEA interlocutors that MHA objections made certain CT cooperation impossible. (NOTE: Our inability to engage MHA on policy matters leaves us with solely the MEA’s word on such occasions. End Note.) The Intelligence Bureau (IB) and Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) compete on CT intelligence issues; the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the FBI-equivalent, is the national-level law enforcement agency. Most CT activities, from security to investigation and prosecution, happen at the state level, however, and the various states and Union Territories exhibit varying (typically low) levels of cooperation amongst each other and with the federal government. The National Security Council Secretariat, which enjoys a wealth of subject-matter experts
SIPDIS (vice the rest of the Indian bureaucracy, which dramatically shifts portfolios every few years), is worth pursuing in areas within their scope, such as cybersecurity (see Para 20), as well as other areas they (or NSA Narayanan) seek to add to their mandate.
Threat Assessment: Priority on Jihadis
————————————–
¶5. (C) Terrorism conducted by jihadi groups based in Pakistan — and sometimes with the support of elements of the GOP — is historically the most lethal and the most politically volatile strain of terrorism in India. Reflecting improved counterinsurgency policies, civilian fatalities from terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir have
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substantially decreased from 2001-2004 (approximately 20% decrease each year), according to Indian government statistics and a leading independent Indian terrorism expert. The data for the first nine months of 2005 showed a continued decline, but a spike in lethal attacks after the October 8 earthquake resulted in the 2005 levels being roughly equal to those for 2004. Since January 2005, jihadis have carried out or are believed to be responsible for lethal attacks at three popular markets on Diwali (Ref N) and Jamma Masjid (Septel), both in Delhi, as well as Ayodhya (Ref Q), Varanasi (Ref F), and Bangalore (Ref J), in addition to the litany of deadly bombings and shootings in J&K itself. These new targets in the Hindi heartland and the south reflect a new and dangerous trend that bears close watching.
¶6. (C) Kashmiri terrorist groups made numerous attacks on elected Indian and Kashmiri politicians, targeted civilians in public areas, and attacked security forces, killing more than 500 civilians in 2005, most of whom were Kashmiri Muslims. Attacks continued in 2006, with democracy in Kashmir a primary focus. Candidates and elected officials were attacked and murdered, and terrorists apparently prioritized deterring Kashmiris from voting. Coordinated attacks on several sites in central Srinagar on April 16 underlined terrorists’ opposition to April 24 state assembly by-elections (Septel). Foreign Terrorist Organizations Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), at times operating through front names from camps in Pakistan, claimed responsibility for many of these attacks. Some of these groups maintain ties with al-Qaida, although the Indian government takes pride in claiming there is no direct al-Qaida presence in the country outside of Kashmir.
Threat Assessment: Naxals a Rising Threat
—————————————–
¶7. (SBU) Indian terrorism analysts — in some respects more so than the GOI — are concerned that Naxal terrorism, which covers a broad region of Eastern, Central, and Southern India, is growing in sophistication and lethality and will be a significant long-term challenge. Unlike terrorists in Kashmir, these Naxalite groups are not dependent on support from outside India; the GOI and independent experts assess that Naxals purchase some weapons from Nepalese Maoists, but (per the GOI) “the relationship is commercial, not ideological” (Septel). The Naxals, such as those in the Communist Party of India-Maoist, also are moving toward a more unified command system than the plethora of small jihadi groups that co-exist alongside LeT and JeM. Furthermore, while jihadis are expanding their area of operations to conduct attacks, particularly in cities, Naxals are expanding the area of (rural) territory they effectively control (i.e. collect taxes, adjudicate disputes, etc.).
¶8. (SBU) Naxal groups often target Indian security forces vice civilians. However, in West Bengal, they have targeted members of the state ruling Communist Party of India (Marxist), who are considered an ideological competitor by the Maoist Naxalites. Overall deaths due to Naxal violence have remained relatively constant at approximately 500-600
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annually in recent years. The two primary Naxalite groups in 2004 combined to form the banned Communist Party of India (Maoist); this construct continues to hold. PM Singh on April 13 publicly called Naxalism “the single biggest internal security challenge” at a conclave of the chief ministers of the Naxal-affected states; how effective the GOI and the state governments are in stemming this threat remains to be seen.
¶9. (SBU) In September 2005, the Indian Home Ministry and the senior elected and bureaucratic officials from the 12 Naxal-affected states (Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh, Jharkand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) created an Interstate Task Force to streamline regional anti-Naxal operations. The GOI is also modernizing the weapons and equipment for state police forces in Naxal-affected areas.
Threat Assessment: Northeast Terrorism Not a GOI Priority
——————————————— ————
¶10. (SBU) Terrorism in India’s Northeast states (Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland, Tripura, and Meghalaya) consists of many groups — some of which maintain bases in Bangladesh, according to GOI and Indian media reports — that are small in number compared to other terrorist organizations in India, and their reach does not extend out of the region. Civilian deaths due to terrorism in the Northeast have been declining in recent years, according to Indian government data and a leading independent Indian terrorism expert. For 2005, between 300 and 350 civilians were killed in Northeast terrorism. This variant of Indian terrorism, like Naxalism, attracts little attention from Delhi.
Why the GOI Focuses on the Jihadis
———————————-
¶11. (C) The GOI does not focus on Naxalite or Northeast terrorism with the intensity it devotes to jihadi terrorists, probably for a combination of the following reasons:
– Attacks by Naxalites and Northeast groups remain confined to rural areas far from New Delhi.
– The Naxals generally target security forces vice civilians.
– The Naxals lack external support, which makes them a purely Indian problem, something the GOI cannot blame on other countries; the GOI blames Pakistan and Bangladesh as instigators/supporters of jihadi terrorism, and Bangladesh for also allowing Northeast terrorists support or, at minimum, safe haven. The GOI can and does exploit these links to attract international sympathy (and partial absolution) for its own domestic governance and border security short-comings.
– Because Naxalites and Northeast groups are treated as domestic issues, they are largely handled by the individual
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states in which these groups operate. The GOI over the past year has tried to tie together the anti-Naxal efforts of the “Naxal-affected states,” but to no discernible effect thus far, and the states lack the capacity to mount an effective response to the problem.
– The most likely solutions to the problems posed by the Naxal and Northeast groups involve improving local/state governance and economic opportunity, a difficult and long-term solution for New Delhi and the affected states to effect.
Extraterritorial Dimensions of Terrorism in India
——————————————— —-
¶12. (C) Pakistan: The prominent place jihadi terrorism plays in India’s threat perception is a significant irritant in Indo-Pakistan relations. Recent GOI public statements and Indian media suggest Delhi believes cross-border infiltration in March-April dropped significantly, perhaps nearly to zero in March largely due to severe snow conditions, but skeptics remain throughout the Indian bureaucracy and security services. Most of our GOI interlocutors believe Islamabad opens and closes the spigot of cross-border terrorism to influence other aspects of bilateral affairs and to keep “the Kashmir issue” on the front burner. NSA Narayanan in March told the UK High Commissioner he was less worried about LoC infiltration than he was about Pakistani intelligence support for terrorist modules elsewhere in India — such as the cells responsible for the Delhi and Bangalore attacks (Ref G).Another growing concern is that jihadis are infiltrating into Northeast India from Nepal and Bangladesh.
¶13. (C) Bangladesh: The GOI for years has insisted that Northeast terrorist groups and, more recently, Pakistani jihadi groups maintain bases on Dhaka’s side of the Indo-Bangladesh border, and infiltrate across the lengthy, unfenced boundary back and forth at will, owing to a combination of poor governance, conducive terrain, bribery, and/or GOB facilitation (or, at minimum, willfully ignoring Delhi’s pleas) (Refs D, T-V).
¶14. (C) Nepal: As noted above, the GOI does not believe that domestic Naxals and Nepalese Maoists maintain any significant operational links, except for some commercial arms sales from the Nepalese to the Naxals. Nepalese Maoists, however, appear to enjoy relatively free movement within Naxal-held areas in India along the 1,700 km open border. While we frequently hear reports of Nepalese Maoist leaders (including the Number 1 and Number 2 Prachanda and Baburam Bhattarai) spending long periods of time in India with leftist sympathizers, the GOI has assured us repeatedly that it gives no quarter to Nepalese Maoists, and several high-ranking Maoists are being held in Indian jails.
15. (C) The GOI also regularly tells us that Kathmandu, including the airport, has become an operations hub for Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)-supported terrorists, in large part due to its soft border with India. Our interlocutors tell us the RGON turns a blind eye to
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Delhi’s complaints on this matter.
Bioterrorism not on Delhi’s Radar …
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¶16. (C) Few Indians — GOI, think-tanks, etc. — are concerned about bioterrorism (Septel). They generally view it as an over-the-horizon issue, whereas RDX and AK-47s exist in the here-and-now. Some terrorism analysts, including South Asia Terrorism Portal editor Ajai Sahni, chalk this up to the “Panipat Syndrome” (NOTE: According to India’s preeminent strategic thinker K Subrahmanyam, in three separate decisive battles, Indian empires declined to defend themselves against Western invaders by reinforcing strategic choke-points like the Khyber Pass. They instead waited for the advancing force to reach Panipat — a town only 40 miles from Delhi, and over 450 miles after penetrating the Khyber — before reacting. “Then mad panic and ineffectiveness, followed by a crushing defeat. A devastating lack of strategic sense, either in offense or defense.” End Note). One terrorism scholar who has edited three Indian books on bio-terrorism told us that his books sell relatively well in the US and Western Europe, but not in India. The Home and Health Ministries are lead agencies in this field, with the Agriculture Ministry a possible player as well.
¶17. (C) Controls at bio-tech facilities are weak to non-existent, making India’s large industrial capacity a potential source of hazardous bio-materials if not bio-weapons. That said, bio-terrorism would at most appeal to the larger jihadi terrorist groups (i.e. LeT and JeM). Naxals and Northeast separatist terrorists rely more heavily on local support, their area of operations is limited to the territory they seek to “liberate,” and they lack operational reach into Delhi, all factors that suggest they would not seek to employ bio-terrorism. In a sign of latent awareness of this threat, however, the National Institute of Virology in Pune will hold a biosecurity workshop May 2-4 with the cooperation of Sandia National Labs.
… Nor is WMD Terrorism
————————
¶18. (C) Many of the same factors at play within the GOI and terrorist groups active in India regarding bio-terrorism also relate to WMD terrorism more broadly. We have seen little evidence of GOI interest or planning on the potential of WMD terrorism. In fact, outside of a few New Delhi think tanks, there appears to be no discourse on this topic whatsoever, with the exception of occasional (and, to Mission’s knowledge, unfounded) speculation on whether the AQ Khan proliferation network may have supplied nuclear materials to jihadi groups or al-Qaida. Many of the nuclear non-proliferation measures that the GOI has undertaken, such as harmonization of its export controls with the NSG/MTCR and installation of CSI at the Mumbai Port, also help prevent terrorists from acquiring or shipping WMD-related items.
Cyber-Terrorism
—————
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¶19. (C) Cyber-security, by contrast, is an increasing source of Indian concern and focus. India hosts a significant number of high-tech professionals, many of whom possess the skills to effect cyber-terrorism; however, reports of “cyber-terrorism” in India have heretofore related only to defacement of GOI websites. We have seen no credible information about terrorist groups attempting to execute cyber-terrorists acts, although some groups are undoubtedly interested, and jihadi groups particularly are understood to use e-mail, Internet chat services, and other digital communications platforms. That said, India’s increasingly remote-controlled critical infrastructure (energy generation, transportation, water and sanitation, communications, etc.) present tempting targets for tech-savvy terrorists.
¶20. (C) The National Security Council Secretariat is the lead agency on cybersecurity and cyber-terrorism, and The Mission’s NSCS interlocutors have been both knowledgeable about potential threats, energetic about trying to head them off, and open to bilateral assistance to protect critical systems, all pleasant surprises compared to our overall dealings with the GOI. The US-India Cybersecurity Forum, launched in 2000 as an outgrowth of our CT cooperation, now evinces frequent and robust interaction at both the policymaker and technical levels (Refs H, I, and L). The NSCS is keen to engage in new subject areas, including protection of the above listed critical infrastructure services. Given this positive interaction and the fact that the NSCS largely employs subject-matter experts vice generalists, it might be useful to pursue NSCS branching out into other areas of USG interest, such as bio- and WMD-terrorism, in the hope that we can replicate the progress we have enjoyed in cybersecurity.
Waging the “Battle of Ideas”
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¶21. (C) We can learn a great deal from India’s management of its large society to minimize extremist ideologies. India enjoys a democratic, multi-religious, multi-cultural, heterogeneous, multi-ethnic society where all major world religions are practiced freely. Isolated elements of religious extremism of many varieties have, however, occurred in India — notably among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs — although extremists as a whole are by far outnumbered by “secular” moderates. In the Indian context, “secularism” is synonymous with tolerance for all faiths, and does not imply life devoid of religion, although religious freedom — including atheism — is protected and guaranteed by the Constitution and a long history of court precedent. At a time when many nations appear to be losing ground to extremist movements, India’s trendlines are pointing in the right direction, bolstered by strong indigenous traditions of communal co-habitation, non-violent political protest, a free press, and a realization by politicians that religious hatred is not a vote getter among the increasingly savvy, globalized, and prosperous Indian electorate. Nevertheless, the risk always remains of isolated outbreaks of sectarian violence, especially in response to the terrorism that has
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plagued India for decades, or when provoked by regional politicians for their narrow political purposes (for example, the recently passed anti-conversion legislation in Rajasthan, see Refs A and C).
¶22. (C) Mission India executes robust and forward leaning programming designed to counter extremist ideologies (Ref O). We provide numerous exchange, educational, and outreach programs to counter extremism, primarily through the Front Office, PA, POL, and USAID. A special public diplomacy effort is made to engage with Indian Muslims, including young students and other young people, and to foster interfaith dialogue among India’s multi-cultural and multi-religious communities. Front Office, PA, and POL officers provide critical personal and media interaction to perpetuate the USG message of moderation and tolerance. Our outreach ranges from one-on-one engagement with elites to press interviews to mass-audience interaction to overcome misperceptions and stereotypes. We also monitor and report trends in religious extremism.
Terrorist Finance and Anti-Money Laundering Legislation
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¶23. (SBU) India’s Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA), which came into effect in July 2005, allows for the freezing, confiscation and seizure of instrumentalities used in, or intended for use in, terrorist financing in limited circumstances, and provides the statutory basis for setting up India’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). However, it does not cover properties, including non-cash assets, that are intended to be used by an individual terrorist, or property of corresponding value.
¶24. (SBU) The PMLA also aims to combat money laundering in India and allows for confiscation and seizure of the property obtained from laundered money, but only when there is a conviction of a predicate offense. The PMLA stipulates that whoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assist, or is knowingly a party, or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the proceeds of crime and projecting it as untainted property, shall be guilty of offenses of money-laundering. (For an in-depth assessment of the PMLA and the FIU, please see Ref B.)
¶25. (SBU) Top GOI officials have publicly expressed their strong interest in India becoming a member of the Egmont Group and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). India’s Finance Ministry hosted a FATF delegation on April 12-13 whose purpose was to determine if India should be granted FATF observer status (Septel). The US Treasury Department’s FINCEN and the FIU are considering reciprocal visits for May-July. Levels of cooperation are not where we would like them to be, although the trend lines are encouraging.
Airline/Airport Security and Anti-Hijacking Policy
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¶26. (C) We have significant gaps in our understanding of how
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far the GOI has come in operationalizing its new anti-hijacking policy since it was unveiled in August 2005 (Ref P). Our understanding, based on Indian press articles, is that the Indian Air Force (IAF) is now allowed to counter a 9/11-like attempt to use aircraft as weapons of mass destruction by shooting them down; airport ground crews are directed (not simply “permitted”) to attempt to keep a grounded, hijacked aircraft on the tarmac; and negotiators are restricted in what they can offer terrorists in a hostage situation. The opacity of the Home Ministry has been a significant obstacle in learning more; our British counterparts here report similar difficulty in getting to the ground truths here. Some of the questions that warrant probing include:
– More specifics on how the GOI will accommodate foreign aircraft, including if a foreign plane is hijacked while in Indian airspace.
– What additional equipment or training Indian entities will require, and if there are opportunities for USG training and American firms.
– How first responders will prioritize between timeliness and chain-of-command in trying to make difficult decisions.
¶27. (SBU) The recent launch of two direct Delhi-US flights (Continental and American) and the expected announcement of several more such routes make this discussion of hijacking protocols particularly important.
ATA Training
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¶28. (SBU) Forensics is weak in India — only two DNA labs service the entire country. Few police officers outside major cities are trained in safeguarding and exploiting electronic data, although this capacity is expanding under indigenous cybersecurity training and cooperative training with US government agencies. As a consequence, terrorism investigations and court cases tend to rely upon confessions, many of which are obtained under duress if not beatings, threats, or, in some cases, torture. These factors, along with a creaky and corrupt judiciary, contribute to cases lingering in the courts for years.
¶29. (SBU) India is a voracious consumer of ATA training, having digested 42 courses involving 900 Indian security officials and accepting some $10 million in equipment transfers since 1995. The sheer size of India’s police, paramilitary, and other security agencies at the state and federal levels, however, guarantees that an abundance of first responders and investigators will be behind the training curve. Our goal here is to rationalize ATA training to create a more coherent syllabus that would address specific Indian security needs, in cooperation with the GOI and (ideally) with India’s other CT partners to avoid duplication of efforts. RSO notes Indian security agencies are enthusiastic about receiving ATA training and graduates are being tasked with replicating courses, which they appear
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to be doing effectively (Ref E). Other encouraging news is that course graduates include officers who have since been promoted to senior ranks and a recent recipient of the President’s Police Medal of Gallantry.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Lost/Stolen Passports
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¶30. (SBU) The GOI has heretofore been reluctant in sharing its database of lost and stolen passports with INTERPOL, a move which would greatly increase INTERPOL’s database (and therefore our own). This CTJWG, coming more than 18 months after the prior JWG, will be an ideal time to reiterate this request. This has been an important initiative of the Bureau of Consular Affairs, and an issue CA Assistant Secretary Maura Harty raised at senior levels during visits to India in 2005. The US routinely provides its lost and stolen passport data to Interpol as a means of sharing this information with other nations, and India should, too.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Investigations
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¶31. (SBU) While RSO’s liaison with the Indian police is adequate, there is room for improvement. The Indian bureaucracy stalls many investigative requests with demands for written letters to various offices, additional approvals, and the failure to pass correspondences between Indian law enforcement agencies. The GOI requires many US Embassy sections and agencies to work directly with national-level counterparts; however, the RSOs are free from this restriction and are able to interact with both the local and national police agencies throughout India. RSO and other Embassy law enforcement elements must often pass investigative requests between Indian law enforcement agencies, acting as the middle man, although the use of personal “unofficial” contacts can sometimes expedite an investigation.
Information/Intelligence Sharing: Tactical Threat Reporting
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¶32. (S/NF) RSO sends the majority of threat information investigative requests to the New Delhi Police Department’s Special Cell, which is the primary law enforcement entity in New Delhi tasked with the investigation of terrorist activity and major case investigations. As with all investigative efforts in India the office is only as good as its local contacts; the RSO often has greater success by discreetly contacting a local officer in the Special Cell in lieu of sending in an official request, many of which are not acted upon. RSO receives very little follow-up information from Delhi police after a terrorist attack, such as the status of the police investigations or efforts to apprehend suspects; the information RSO does receive is usually already available in the media.
¶33. (S/NF) RSO has found that the sharing of tactical threat information with Delhi police is woefully lacking. RSO and the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) have been pushing the
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GOI, to date unsuccessfully, to establish a liaison position that would serve as a real-time clearinghouse for threat information and coordinating responses to imminent threats. Post would appreciate if this request could be raised again during the CTWG.
¶34. (SBU) As noted above, much CT activity happens at the state level. India’s lack of a national crime database seriously inhibits CT analysis and cooperation among the states and between states and the federal security services (CBI and IB), and allows terrorists to potentially take advantage of crossing from one jurisdiction to another to escape detection and broaden their attack patterns.
MLAT Implementation
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¶35. (SBU) The US-India MLAT came into effect in October 2005. In November, the USG requested GOI assistance under MLAT regarding a joint DEA-Indian Narcotics Control Board (NCB) investigation — the DEA requested that the NCB provide documentary evidence and testimony from an NCB officer for the criminal trial in the US of a co-conspirator in a case involving Internet pharmaceuticals trade. The GOI in February 2006 provided documentary evidence that was forwarded to the US, but the request for an NCB officer to testify was not honored despite repeated high-level interventions by the Embassy, and there has been no official explanation why the officer was not sent to the US. Informal feedback received by DEA indicates the GOI is unclear on whether MLAT covers this type of request. It will be important to schedule formal implementation talks soon, either in Washington, or probably most effectively in New Delhi. DOJ’s office of International Affairs will likely have the lead in this area.
Other Issues the GOI May Raise
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¶36. (C) IC-814: Repeated GOI demarches last year seeking information on the December 1999 IC-814 hijackers suggest that some CT interlocutors Delhi believe the USG has additional information or access that could be useful in the trial of the hijackers, several of whom are being tried in absentia (Refs M and S). We have provided considerable information in response to GOI requests. This is an issue that largely remains dormant but flares up from time to time, and the GOI may view the CTJWG as an opportunity to renew its request.
¶37. (C) Dawood Ibrahim: Mumbai crime boss and Specially Designated Global Terrorist Dawood Ibrahim is wanted by Indian police for having planned and financed thirteen explosions in Mumbai in 1993 that killed almost 300 civilians; he reportedly now lives in Pakistan and the UAE, an assertion bolstered by periodic reporting in Pakistan news magazines (see below). He is also wanted for arms smuggling, counterfeiting, narcotics trafficking, murder, and other criminal matters. Dawood’s daughter’s July 2005 high-profile wedding reception brazenly took place at the Grand Hyatt
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Hotel in Dubai, and was the more recent rubbing of salt in this festering sore (Ref R).
¶38. (C) The “List of 20”: The prior (Vajpayee) government had sent to Islamabad a request to extradite twenty terrorists and criminals that many in the GOI believe reside in Pakistan. The list includes the leaders of JeM, LeT and Hizbul Mujahedeen; Dawood Ibrahim and six members of his criminal organization, including several the GOI linked to the 1993 Mumbai bomb blasts or a conspiracy to kill former Home Minister LK Advani; four terrorists wanted for their roles in the IC-814 hijacking; and five Khalistani (Sikh separatist) terrorists. When in power, the BJP government used phe “List of 20” as a club with which to publicly beat Pakistan; the current UPA government has only recently revived the issue, and then in the less political context of a law enforcement bilateral. However, one of our main CT interlocutors, Ajai Sahni, told us recently that “the best thing Pakistan could do is to turn those guys over to the Indian government, but Delhi would undoubtedly make a hash of it.”
Comment: Opportunity to Move Ahead
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¶39. (C) This JWG offers an opportunity much like the July 18 agreement to set ambitious goals and strive to meet them. The challenge is to build on recent successes in the broader bilateral relationship to move our counterterrorism agenda forward at a faster pace and to a deeper end. Critical to this effort is a GOI decision to boost intel exchange if we are to move beyond rhetoric in our CT relationship. Mission Station Chief will participate in the CTJWG meetings and brief Mr. Crumpton beforehand. BLAKE